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Abstract  
Local governments are particularly relevant to people’s daily lives as they manage infrastructure 
and services that directly influence quality of life. Elected mayors tend to be more responsive to 
the needs of the poor majority than centrally-appointed mayors or mayors elected by fellow 
councillors. Colombia’s municipal mayors have been elected since 1988, with local governments 
given increased responsibilities and powers to raise local revenues. In this paper four municipal 
mayors at the end of their four-year term reflect, in their own words, on the role they have 
played in shaping their municipalities. They recount their personal engagement with local politics, 
share their views about their society and problems such as poverty, inequality and violence, 
describe the business of managing a local government and exercising leadership sometimes in 
difficult circumstances, reflect on the qualities of a mayor, and explain how they sought 
continuity for their government programmes. They see themselves as outsiders struggling 
against local political machineries. With one exception, they do not seem to see the poor as their 
natural interlocutors on whom they can rely for unswerving political support and to whom most 
of their energy should be directed. 
 
Keywords: Local government; local politics; governance; mayors; Colombia; urban 
poverty; urban inequality 
 
I. The rise and rise of municipal mayors 
In recent years, local governments in many parts of the world have undergone a 
fascinating transformation from dull and rather politically obscure ‘black boxes’, heavily 
dependent on central governments and with limited functions, to laboratories for 
political and technological innovation, a focus for the vociferous demands of increasingly 
educated voters and organised communities, and launch-pads for ambitious provincial 
politicians seeking higher office.  
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a new figure appeared in the local – and occasionally national – 
media: the city mayor. Whether in countries that had recently returned to democratic 
elections after years of autocratic rule, or in long established democracies such as the 
United Kingdom, mayors started vying with national politicians for voters’ attention and 
a spot in TV chat shows. Following political and constitutional reforms, elected mayors 
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came into office with newly acquired powers and a direct mandate from thousands or – 
in cases such as Sao Paulo, Cape Town or London – millions of voters (thus arguably 
with a stronger direct political endorsement than that of a prime minister elected by a 
small constituency in a parliamentary democracy).  
 
The mayor has of course been a familiar political figure for decades in US politics, where 
some cities are virtually synonymous with individuals who left their mark over a period 
of years or even decades: Richard Daley in the Chicago of the 1950s to the 1970s, and 
then his son since 1989; in New York, LaGuardia in the 1930s and 1940s and more 
recently Rudolph Giuliani, whose name is inextricably linked to the aftermath of the 11 
September terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers. In Western Europe, strong local 
government leaders are associated with Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, France) 
and only recently with a handful of cities further North. In Latin America, widespread 
political reforms in the past two decades gave voters the possibility of directly electing 
mayors who, until then, had been appointed either by central government (usually the 
President, in the case of capital cities) or by provincial governments.2  
 
In Colombia municipal mayors were elected by universal suffrage for the first time in 
1988.3 Following decentralisation reforms enshrined in the new 1991 national political 
constitution, local governments were given much increased responsibilities as well as 
powers to raise taxes and other sources of revenue. Under these reforms the mayor 
became a central figure in advancing the interests of the municipality and the well-being 
of its citizens. In the process some mayors, particularly in the larger cities such as 
Bogotá and Medellín, have gained not only local but also national prominence by 
enacting bold fiscal and institutional reforms, helping to reduce crime and violence, 
fostering tolerance and the creation of a ‘citizen culture’, and launching major urban 
programmes that helped coalesce major shifts in their cities’ trajectories.4  
 
In this paper four acting municipal mayors in Colombia reflect, in their own words, on 
the role they have played in shaping the fortunes of their fellow citizens and the 
                                                 
2 Ward, Peter, 1996, “Contemporary issues in the government and administration of Latin 
American mega-cities”, in Alan Gilbert (ed.), The Mega-city in Latin America, United Nations 
University Press, New York, pp. 53-72. 
3 Mayors were elected initially for a period of two years, subsequently increased to three and, 
since 2004, to four-year terms. Mayors can seek re-election, although not for successive terms.  
4 Detailed discussions on Bogotá’s changes abound. See, for example, Gilbert, Alan and Julio D 
Dávila, 2002, “Bogotá: Progress within a hostile environment”, in Henry A. Dietz and David J. 
Myers (editors), Capital City Politics in Latin America: Democratisation and Empowerment, Lynne 
Reiner, Boulder, pp. 29-63; Dávila, Julio D, 2005, “La transformación de Bogotá”, in Fernando 
Cepeda (ed.), Fortalezas de Colombia, Editorial Planeta, Bogotá, pp. 417-439; Gilbert, Alan, 
2006, “Good urban governance: Evidence of a model city?”, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 
Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 392-419. Much of the recent literature on Medellín has focused on violence; 
see, for example, Brand, Peter, 2002, “Environments of harmony and social conflict: The role of 
the environment in defusing urban violence in Medellín, Colombia”, in Romaya, Sam and Carole 
Rakodi (editors), Building Sustainable Urban Settlements: Approaches and Case Studies in the 
Developing World, ITDG Publishing, London; Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco and Ana María 
Jaramillo, 2004, “Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the privatization of security – the case of 
Medellín, Colombia”, Environment and Urbanization Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 17-30. For an overview of 
how illegal drugs helped shaped the city’s recent history see Hylton, Forrest, 2007, “Medellín’s 
makeover”, New Left Review No. 44, pp. 71-89. 
 2
municipalities under their direction. The article draws on separate interviews in 
December 2007, a few days before they officially ended their four-year term.5 The 
mayors – all men between the late-30s and the mid-50s in age – recount their personal 
engagement with local politics, share their views about their own society and some of its 
pressing problems such as poverty, inequality and violence, describe how they went 
about the business of managing a local government and exercising leadership 
sometimes in difficult circumstances, reflect on the qualities of a mayor, and explain how 
they sought continuity for their government programmes.  
 
II. Four cities, four mayors 
Colombia, a ‘lower-middle income economy’ according to the World Bank, has a complex 
recent history marked by moderate economic growth and orthodox macro-economic 
management, rapid urbanisation with population growth spread across a spectrum of 
medium and large cities (as opposed to a single primate centre as is frequently the case 
in Latin America), high levels of socio-economic inequality, major social dislocations, and 
a high incidence of violent deaths both in urban and rural areas.6 Since this is not the 
place to examine the causes behind the violence, suffice it to say that a major 
contributor is the profitable drug business fuelled by international narcotic consumption 
(mainly in the US and Europe). However, the crime figures that made Medellín 
internationally notorious in the 1980s now seem largely buried in the past, as they are in 
many other smaller cities. Violent deaths are more likely to occur in relatively remote, 
sparsely populated regions resulting from clashes between the country’s military (heavily 
funded by the US government and at times supported by local mafia-like paramilitary 
gangs) and armed rebel groups funded through kidnappings, extortion and cocaine 
exports with few remnants of the social justice ideals that sparked their creation in the 
1960s. 
 
The four cities featured in this article are not meant to be representative of Colombia’s 
1,099 municipalities. In a country with a population of 42 million people, five cities with 
one million plus and 34 cities of between 100,000 and one million, this small sample can 
only offer a brief insight into the challenges faced by local governments at different 
demographic scales.7 Moreover, the sample cities are located in only two of the 
country’s four distinct geographical regions – though it is in the Andean region, where 
three of the sampled cities lie, that the vast majority of the population lives. The fact 
that no woman mayor could be interviewed is regrettable, as this might have 
contributed a different perspective on the job of mayor in what is still a fairly 
conservative and somewhat patriarchal society. Women are less inclined than men to go 
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into politics, particularly in areas where armed violence prevails, to the extent that 
women represent only 95 out of 1,099 municipal mayors elected for the period 2008-
2011.8 
 
The characteristics of the four cities and their population in 2005 are as follows: 
Medellín, at 3.3 million inhabitants, is the country’s second largest city9 and is also a 
major manufacturing and financial service centre, marked by deep social and economic 
inequalities; Manizales, with a population of 360,000, is located in what was for some 
decades a very prosperous coffee-growing region that has suffered badly from the sharp 
drop in international coffee prices; Santa Marta, with a population of 415,000, founded 
in 1525 by the Spanish conquistadors, is a port on the Caribbean sea and a tourist 
destination; and Zipaquirá, with a population of 93,000, and located in a fertile 
agricultural region 48 km North of Bogotá, Colombia’s capital city, was known from pre-
Columbian times for its large inland salt-mine – and from the 20th Century onwards for 
the vast subterranean Catholic cathedral built inside it. 
 
The four mayors were approached for different reasons: the work done by Medellín’s 
and Zipaquirá’s mayors is generally regarded by different sources in Colombia, including 
the national government, as good examples of highly competent city management.10 
Manizales is highly regarded nationally and even internationally for its innovative and 
socially-sensitive environmental management practices and for the close collaboration 
between the local government and local universities in shaping the city’s future.11 Santa 
Marta represents a particularly challenging case of municipal management. From the 
viewpoint of a municipal manager, Colombia’s recent history, briefly outlined earlier, has 
taken a particular toll on Santa Marta. In stark contrast to the other three, this port city 
has a recent history of serious mismanagement and local corruption, made worse by 
violence and intimidation at the hands of the region’s ‘paramilitaries’, formerly private 
armies in the pay of large landowners seeking to defend themselves from kidnapping 
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conurbation, Colombia”, in Atkinson, Adrian, Julio D Dávila, Edésio Fernandes and Michael 
Mattingly (editors), The Challenge of Environmental Management in Urban Areas, Ashgate, 
Aldershot, UK, pp. 275-286. 
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and blackmail from left-wing guerrillas, and now remoulded into extortion rackets. The 
city is effectively bankrupt and its finances are severely reduced and overseen closely by 
the national government, thus placing an additional burden on the elected local 
government. Thus, it is not surprising that much of the mayor’s efforts, as documented 
below, are focused on improving the city’s finances and securing alternative sources of 
revenue for the municipality. 
 
 
III. Governance, mayors and local governments 
Local government is the government tier that is nearest to citizens and is, in theory, the 
area of public sector activity that can most easily be monitored and controlled by citizens 
themselves. Local governments are particularly relevant to people’s daily lives as they 
tend to manage infrastructure and services that directly influence people’s quality of life 
as well as their sense of order and security.12 Because of this, in countries where the 
poor constitute a majority or a substantial share of the population, a well-functioning 
local government that focuses on their needs can play a crucial role in reducing poverty 
and increasing opportunity for those who are most disadvantaged.  
 
Elected mayors tend to be more responsive to the needs of the poor majority than 
centrally-appointed mayors or mayors elected by fellow councillors. This would appear 
to arise from the electoral process where mayoral candidates need to secure the votes 
of the poor majority “by demonstrating responsiveness to their agenda”.13 This may be 
less true in contexts where mayors cannot be re-elected for an immediate second term 
(as is the case in Colombia) so they can renege on their promises without fear of 
political reprisals from voters, where the poor lack the necessary political organization to 
demand their rights, or where the poor live in neighbouring municipalities but commute 
to work to the core municipality where they have no electoral visibility (as is the case of 
Manizales). 
 
In Western democratic traditions of political representation, municipal governments are 
meant to represent the general interests of the community of people within their 
boundaries and to facilitate the participation of citizens in public institutions. In this 
tradition local governments tend to be endowed with the role of fostering initiatives 
designed to maintain and improve the quality of life of their citizens. For some 
commentators, the existence of deep democratic roots in local spaces of political 
representation offer a guarantee that national democratic practices will also be 
maintained.14  
 
The scope of action by local government is not entirely within its control insofar as it is 
located within the larger canvas drawn by the goals and actions of a range of external 
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actors including the central and provincial states, investors, and even international 
organised crime. The capacity to respond to these forces will, to some extent, be shaped 
by the nature of local leadership, the structure of local government and its relationship 
to the national (or provincial) government.  
 
Research on local government in Europe suggests that, historically, strong leadership 
has tended to prevail in a context of weak institutions; such is the case of politically 
centralized countries in Southern Europe, where local governments have limited 
functions and local government leaders see their role as maximising central government 
resources through lobbying or through party political machineries. A contrasting model, 
more widely found in Northern European countries with more decentralized systems, 
involves local governments with a greater range of functions and discretion, though 
mainly concerned with service delivery where local leaders are expected to be “good 
managers of collective goods”.15  
 
The profound economic, institutional, social and ideological changes experienced the 
world over since the 1980s that affected the way governments operate can be 
encapsulated in the notion of a shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’.16 In theory, this 
new governance involves a movement from the hierarchical, top-down exercise of power 
and rules of state-based systems, to more horizontal, networked systems reliant on the 
interaction of independent and inter-dependent actors who share a degree of trust.17 
 
In a context of rapidly growing urban populations, infrastructure shortages and 
mounting fiscal deficits, and pressurized by multi-lateral lending institutions, central 
governments in many developing countries adopted a double strategy to shed 
responsibilities, horizontally to the private sector and other non-government agents such 
as NGOs or community organizations, and vertically to local governments.18 
 
The new set of responsibilities and roles exerts additional strains on local government 
leadership insofar as the expectation is that it should engage in networking with other 
actors whilst becoming entrepreneurial in a context where cities compete with each 
other for national and international resources. The response in some contexts has been 
to personalize the selection of leadership while increasing the concentration of powers in 
the hands of individual leaders.19 Thus, we increasingly witness the emergence of the 
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17 Swyngedouw, Eric, 2005, “Governance innovation and the citizen: The Janus face of 
governance-beyond-the-state”, Urban Studies, Vol. 42, No. 11, pp. 1991-2006. 
18 These shifts are widely discussed in the literature. See, for example, Pierre, J. and B. Guy 
Peters, 2000, Governance, Politics and the State, Macmillan, London; Nickson, Andrew, 2006, 
“The factors driving government reform” in Alam, Munawwar and Andrew Nickson (editors), 
Managing Change in Local Governance, Commonwealth Secretariat, London, pp. 25-32. 
19 See reference 14, Steyvers at al. (2008). 
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‘mayor as CEO’ phenomenon where mayors are supposed to embody not only political 
qualities but also impeccable managerial credentials.20  
 
 
IV. The interviews 
Despite the media attention that some municipal mayors have enjoyed in their own 
cities and countries, in-depth explorations of the challenges involved in exercising the 
job of a mayor are rare. This article and the interview by Florencia Almansi with the 
mayor of Rosario, Argentina, also in this issue, are attempts to fill this gap. Although the 
space given to each mayor in this paper is still limited (given what were in most cases 
very long interviews), I hope that the tone of the discussion and the willingness of the 
four mayors to share their rich experience will be appreciated by readers interested in 
local development and politics, particularly the capacity of local leadership to steer a 
socially progressive form of change. Their responses (translated from Spanish by me) 
have been grouped under a set of headings. I have added short interpolations in square 
brackets to clarify some passages. I am deeply indebted to the four mayors for giving 
me so much time at a very busy period in their schedule.  
 
a. Personal trajectories 
Mayors were asked how they became involved in politics and particularly how they took 
the decision to run for local government office. All except Zipaquirá’s mayor were born 
into well-off families who could afford to pay for their education to university level. 
 
We start with Sergio Fajardo, Medellín’s mayor, who has spent much of his 
professional career as a Mathematics professor at an elite private university in Bogotá. 
With a PhD from the US, his bid for mayor was his first incursion into electoral politics. 
In media interviews after the end of his mayoralty he has made no secret of his 
intention to run for President of the country. 
 
Sergio Fajardo:  My identity in life was always as a scientist …  I always kept an eye on 
society from the viewpoint of a mathematician. Why do certain things take place? Why 
does this happen and not that? Why are there such deep social inequalities?...  
 
I delved into writings on peace … and always had an interest in conflict and more 
particularly in Colombia’s historical violence…  
 
[In Medellín] I met with people and gradually provided the lead to … an independent 
civic movement, principles, proposals, a new approach to politics, coherence, neither Left 
nor Right, not one or the other, but (stressing) that this is the space that helps define us… 
 
 
Although involved with the private sector on and off until his election as mayor of 
Manizales in 2005, Luis Roberto Rivas’ first elected position was as a provincial 
assembly member in the mid-1990s. He was later associated with Manizales’ municipal 
government, largely in an executive capacity, before launching his candidature for 
mayor. 
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Luis Roberto Rivas:  I had been working in the private sector… [In the mid-1990s] I 
became involved in politics with a group of friends also working in the private sector … 
our aim was to defeat the province’s political coalition [of the two long established 
traditional parties, Liberal and Conservative with a strong grip on local politics]… In the 
midst of the severe crisis due to low coffee prices [our proposals for the municipality 
included] information technologies, reforestation and tourism… 
 
At the end of 1997 we had local elections and a popular candidate was elected mayor 
with 72,000 votes, the highest in the city’s history, with which he defeated the political 
coalition… He and I hadn’t met and he invited me … to head Infimanizales, an institute 
that arose out of the unbundling of the city’s utility companies into brand new separate 
companies … as a way of shedding the heavy pension and social security burden of the 
old city company. Infimanizales was given all shares of the new public utility companies 
and at the end of 1997 we sold 55 per cent of the telephone company’s shares for which 
the city received a sizeable amount of funds… 
 
In 1999 I was re-appointed head of Infimanizales for three years by [the new mayor]… it 
was then that we were able to start putting into effect our proposals for the city. I then 
launched my candidature and won with a difference of a mere 485 votes over the second 
candidate; we nearly lost! 
 
Santa Marta’s mayor, Francisco ‘Chico’ Zúñiga, has in common with Fajardo that the 
mayoralty was his first elected post. Although he was head of the city’s municipally-
owned telecommunications company in the early 1990s, he was appointed by the 
President as caretaker mayor for 15 months in 1993-4 after a local political crisis. He ran 
unsuccessfully for mayor twice before he was elected for the 2004-2007 term. 
 
‘Chico’ Zúñiga:  I think we did an excellent job [as head of the city’s 
telecommunications company]; we managed to modernize the system and provide the 
whole city with telephone service… and this made some people think that I should launch 
my candidature for mayor … I had never aspired to elected office, least of all to get 
involved in political campaigning. I don’t consider myself a politician. I love my city and 
want the best for it, and enjoy helping people, and this helped me take the jump… I was 
alone, with no political backing, against the city’s political forces, with the city and 
provincial governments against me, and I was defeated by 3,000 votes. I then returned to 
my private sector business. At the next election the same people again asked me to stand 
for office… I ran three times… My campaign [for the 2004-7 mayoralty] was door-to-
door, but the work done in the previous two elections was useful, a seed was planted in 
people. It was a high turnout where people from all sectors voted for me.  
 
 
Zipaquirá’s mayor, José E. Caicedo, was born into a very poor family in Zipaquirá. The 
oldest of seven siblings, he sold home-made patties in the street to help pay for his 
primary and secondary education. After a period in a Catholic seminary where he 
discovered that he had no vocation as a priest, he worked for 10 years with Minuto de 
Dios, an organization founded and led by a charismatic priest whose main aim was to 
build housing for the urban and rural poor using donations from the public, and who 
supported him through university. He obtained a university degree in Forestry 
Engineering and has post-graduate diplomas in public management and in regional 
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development. He was elected to Zipaquirá’s city council for one term before running 
twice for mayor. 
 
José E. Caicedo: [For ten years] I traveled around the country, visiting marginal 
communities, people with massive needs, people living in shacks with plastic roofs, 
crammed in cardboard houses… This made me aware of people’s needs, to strengthen my 
resolve and my social values. I internalized the dictum of the great Catholic theologian 
Saint Augustine: “he who does not live to serve has no use in life”… When I came back 
to my city I realized that the best way to serve people was to be close to power, where 
decisions and investments are made… 
 
I got from my early family life an understanding of poverty, that I could not meet my 
basic needs. If I had not had the chance to study at university I would not be sitting here 
as city mayor… 
 
When I came back I became very active with local communities, through the Juntas de 
Acción Comunal, the most important grassroots organizations in the country.21 After 
seven years of deep immersion in getting to know my city’s community, I decided to get 
involved in politics because I realized that from the viewpoint of citizen participation, the 
angle of community participation, one was limited to asking, to discussions, tirades, but 
could not take decisions… communities cannot help those in power to make decisions… 
 
I was elected as city councilor against the city’s political class, alone, in total solitude 
with my proposal for the city… but supported by leaders who knew who José Caicedo 
was … I got the second highest number of votes in the city Council – amazing.  
 
I [subsequently] lost the race to the mayor’s office, against the three local ‘caciques’ 
[traditional political leaders], I was in fourth place … But I persevered and in the 
following elections I won in a seven-candidate election; I won with three times as many 
votes as the runner-up. 
 
 
b. The qualities of a mayor 
Two of the mayors responded to the question ‘what qualities should a mayor have?’.  
 
Sergio Fajardo (Medellín): I see four qualities: first, honesty with absolutely no 
concessions. Second, knowledge… people still argue that it is enough if someone is 
talented and good at getting votes, but one must study the city’s problems. Third, a huge 
passion for this endeavour. And fourth, a deep social awareness; give the same treatment 
to the humblest and the most powerful people, with the conviction that we are all part of 
one society. 
 
                                                 
21 These are community self-help organisations set up in 1958 by the national government (and 
given impetus in the wake of the 1959 Cuban Revolution) to help fill the gap left by a weak state 
in small-scale rural infrastructure works such as roads and water supply systems. They became 
an important vehicle for improvements in low-income urban areas in the 1960s and 1970s, 
although their usefulness has recently waned as improved local government finances, especially 
in larger cities, have led to better urban infrastructure and service coverage. For a brief 
discussion of their origins in Bogotá see Dávila, Julio D, 2000, Planificación y Política en Bogotá. 
La Vida de Jorge Gaitán Cortés, Alcaldía Mayor, Bogotá. 
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‘Chico’ Zúñiga (Santa Marta):  to be a mayor you need to love your city, have a great 
deal of social awareness especially in cities such as ours where there is so much poverty 
and there are so many vulnerable people. One must be prepared to serve others, be 
willing to help improve things. A leader must show the path that the city should follow, 
this is the most important thing in a mayor. Honesty. Rejection of political patronage.    
 
 
c. Establishing priorities 
Mayors were asked how they went about deciding what their priorities in government 
ought to be. In some cases, their answers show that they benefited from interacting 
with a close circle of supporters.  
  
Sergio Fajardo (Medellín):  Fifty of us worked in this Project, coming at it from 
different sectors: NGOs, the arts, academics, private entrepreneurs, community 
organizations. I provided guidance in the field of education, which was my entry point 
into the public sphere… I argued that education was the engine of social transformation 
and wrote newspaper articles … for me this has always been an intellectual project, to put 
together a proposal for the city. I didn’t go to people asking them to tell me what to do.  I 
participated in discussions. I understood the issues… 
 
Luis Roberto Rivas (Manizales):  During my campaign for mayor I stressed that the 
city’s hospital [closed for some years at the time of his first involvement in local 
government] had to re-open. I signed a pledge at a Notary Public’s office to re-open it as 
a public and teaching hospital, and I made this pledge public at a debate in the 
Autonomous University [of Manizales] in front of TV cameras and radio microphones… 
I said, “I made this pledge not because my word is not worth anything, but because I 
want you to take this pledge very seriously”…  
 
When I won the elections I discovered that the municipal government was seriously in 
debt… according to the national government we ranked 567 in fiscal performance among 
1,099 municipalities. 
 
 
‘Chico’ Zúñiga (Santa Marta): I was aware that the city was in serious financial 
difficulties… legally, the city was now covered by Law 550 [i.e. practically bankrupt] but 
no agreement had been reached with its lenders; it was a task I had to undertake: 
administrative re-structuring, eliminate close to 1,000 jobs. It was tough. I had to shut 
down 10 parastatal agencies… This involves paying a large political price, but it had to 
be done. I knew I had to do it because no one had been willing to do it before me for 
political reasons. If it had been done before it might had been less painful. I did it and the 
city’s finances started slowly to recover. We’ve been paying our debts. Under the terms 
of Law 550, the city’s revenues are tied for the next 14 years, which means there is 
virtually no money for investment… We had to work very hard to lobby the national 
government to get funds for much needed projects: water supply, sanitation, roads. 
 
Finances were the first priority. Secondly, promoting the city as a tourist destination as 
well as a destination for industry. We have excellent weather, we have over other cities 
the advantage of a deep sea port, with a railway, with a dry climate … these qualities had 
to be made known. We gave fiscal incentives to new investors and this helped. And we 
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had to work very hard in improving public services, especially water and sanitation. 
We’ve done much but lots still needs doing, because the city wasted too much time 
because investments were not made to support the city’s future growth… 
 
Education was another area. We have some of the worst educational standards in the 
country; this is an old issue, the result of poor quality teaching, poor school 
infrastructure, teachers who… strike with no apparent reason…  
 
 
José E. Caicedo (Zipaquirá): My proposal was “a mayor who governs facing the city 
makes less mistakes than one who looks away from it”; “he who governs with the people 
has less chances of going wrong than he who governs with a group of close friends or the 
elite”. The mayor’s office should get out of its four walls, it must get about in the 
neighbourhoods, reach out to communities, understand needs. This is crucial to be aware 
of the community’s needs. The second principle is that of solidarity, with clear social 
targets…  
 
 
d. Continuity over time 
One major problem of elected local governments in weak institutional contexts is that 
strong leadership often translates into a desire to ‘start from a blank slate’ and a desire 
to ‘leave a personal mark’.22 This often involves putting an end to programmes and 
projects launched in the preceding administration by starving them of funds or of 
political support, or both. Three of the mayors replied to the questions ‘how do you 
establish a balance between the short and the long term in a local government 
administration?’, and ‘how do you ensure continuity over time of programmes supported 
by your administration?’. 
 
Sergio Fajardo (Medellín): one must be able to plan ahead… we had a clear idea of how 
we wanted to intervene in the city, we were aware of its problems and knew what actions 
we had to initiate. When one has a clear direction, one has a diagnosis of the problems 
and how one should go about it, one can start to act. One must ensure that each new 
project is sustainable. People ask me: “how do we ensure that what you are doing will 
continue?”. I say to them: “vote!”, There is no other way. The Iraq war will end when 
Democrats are voted into the President’s office of the US. It is by voting that decisions 
are taken…. 
 
Our challenge was to break with the past fast in a big way, to show what we were 
prepared to put in practice. Everything we did was conceived to be sustainable. But with 
the enormous powers invested in their office,  any mayor can decide to put an end to it if 
they want to. 
 
 
Luis Roberto Rivas (Manizales):  I have supported [the newly elected city mayor], I 
committed him to continue [our programmes] … I virtually appointed him [as a 
candidate]; he was reluctant at first, he is a private sector man, and he had been heavily 
criticized [as head of the city’s telephone company] for raising rates… We were able to 
                                                 
22 For excellent illustrations of this issue from a range of medium-sized Mexican municipalities, 
see reference 12, Grindle (2007). 
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show that when you place the city and the people at the centre, people respond, they are 
grateful, and he knows that if he does not want to fail he needs to provide continuity [to 
our projects]. 
 
 
‘Chico’ Zúñiga (Santa Marta): In the case of Santa Marta, I think there will be 
continuity because the new mayor is a young person; we have talked since we decided to 
support him in his candidature, and we outlined to him our current policies, our future 
projects ... and there was agreement. He may change several things, but I am sure he will 
continue, because it suits him… But you cannot guarantee [that policies will continue], 
except for projects for which a contract has been signed. 
 
José E. Caicedo (Zipaquirá): [Balancing the short and the long term] requires 
establishing a difference between what is important and what can make headlines in the 
media… One must balance investments so as to eliminate any gaps in governance. One 
also needs a strong personality with clarity of mind, a vision, so as not to despair when 
criticism surfaces today, knowing that tomorrow’s reality will end up being favourable… 
One must target one’s actions and persevere. If your priorities are all over the place and 
you try to do everything at once, you’ll end up doing nothing. You must decide on a set 
of priorities because the city has enormous needs and few resources. You must be aware 
that you will have to sacrifice something, but also be aware of what part of the city will 
end up benefiting as a result of this sacrifice. 
 
 
e. Leadership, networking and ‘mayor as CEO’ 
As discussed above, local governments in Colombia offer an interesting example of the 
governance shifts described earlier, particularly the expectation of mayors to be ‘good 
managers’ with a proven record of managing either private or public sector enterprises 
(preferably both) before engaging as leaders in local politics. They are also expected to 
be good networkers, with a capacity to lobby and negotiate with a diversity of actors, 
from private investors to central government officials to corrupt provincial politicians. In 
the rhetoric that animates much discourse on the capacities of mayors, by contrast, little 
is said of their capacity to deal with organized communities and to move beyond simply 
offering the poor ‘a better deal’ through improved utility services or forced relocations in 
the case of squatters, to engage in more horizontal partnerships involving a range of 
such actors that both empower the poor and disadvantaged, and offer them greater 
control over their own lives. 
 
Below the four interviewees reflect on the broad decision-making powers enjoyed by 
Colombian mayors. In their answers they give ample evidence of the nature of their job, 
as CEOs in their local government, as lobbyists, and as networkers. 
 
 
Sergio Fajardo (Medellín): For us power has been extraordinarily useful in leading this 
transformation… I believe that [a high concentration of] power is generally a good thing, 
and in a democracy society has the right and the possibility of making mistakes. It is 
painful. It is not good to make mistakes. This is what happened in Cali,23 which had 
                                                 
23 Cali, Colombia’s third largest city, has been beset by a recent history of municipal 
mismanagement.  
 12
municipally-owned utility companies like Medellín’s, and they have lost them. They 
made mistakes and the companies were pillaged. Society ends up paying a price, with the 
leaders it deserves at a given point in time. That is the nature of democracy. I think that in 
this context it is good to have [political] power, but there must be checks and balances.  
 
Luis R. Rivas (Manizales): When we were faced with the challenge of redressing fiscal 
imbalances in Manizales, I had an idea of how to get hold of funds for public investment. 
I invited the representatives of the construction and engineering sectors and said “What, 
in your view, are the infrastructure projects that the city should undertake? For I have 
here a technical mobility plan done by the National University”… 
 
[When the national government tried to impose the successful rapid bus transit system 
using articulated buses and dedicated lanes that gave excellent results in Bogotá] we said 
“you cannot do this from the comfort of your desks, come and visit Manizales and you 
will soon realize that it is physically impossible [for the system to work here]… we 
cannot destroy our city” … [The national government] then signed a decree barring the 
central government budget from funding aerial cable cars [arguably a better solution for 
Manizales’ hilly terrain] … They then said “you need to re-plan your bus routes and open 
them to public bidding”; I said “no way! Do you think that me, as mayor, will have an 
interest in inviting people from other cities in the country to become transport 
entrepreneurs in our city? No way, for a simple reason: in the country’s transport system 
there is money of doubtful origin [i.e. laundered from illegal activities], and I do not want 
that money in my city”. 
 
 
‘Chico’ Zúñiga (Santa Marta): I inherited a situation whereby 400 municipal teachers 
had been hired outside the officially approved education budget and this worsened the 
city’s deficit. I had to sack them, which led to strikes and protests, all kinds of problems, 
but it needed doing… At present we have exactly the number of teachers stipulated in the 
Ministry of Education’s budget… We had the support of UNDP and GTZ… There was 
no database, no archival system, no on-line facilities. We were able to put all that in 
place… There is much to be done still, but we’ve done what is most important… 
 
There is a brand new cigarette factory in the city. When I was elected mayor of Santa 
Marta, before taking the oath of office, I heard of a group of investors whom I 
approached… I introduced Santa Marta to them as a good place to invest in, and they 
were surprised. I said to them “Santa Marta has a number of strengths and I am inviting 
you to come and visit”, and I showed them the city’s strengths. I organized a meeting 
with the port company, with the railway company, with the Free Trade Zone authorities, 
with all the public utilities, with the Chamber of Commerce, with the Traders Federation, 
we introduced the city to them. They ended up investing in the city.  At present there are 
also two brand new bio-diesel plants … [including one by a] Japanese investor who 
toured several Colombian cities … and upon knowing that he was here I visited him in 
his hotel and told him “Santa Marta has these strengths” and he said “I will stay here”, 
and immediately started building his plant, which is nearly ready… He got tax incentives, 
exemption on trade and industry and property taxes for 10 years, proportional to the 
number of jobs he creates. 
 
 
José E. Caicedo: [In selecting collaborators] we are not dealing simply with an economic 
issue, but also with an issue of management, trust, motivation. [We are talking about] 
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individuals who can be leaders, who are not afraid of talking to people, who are able to 
govern with citizens and take decisions alongside the people, who do not mind that 
people’s views differ from theirs, who can tell the mayor “I disagree with you, why don’t 
we do it this way instead”, who are not afraid of the mayor but instead see him as a close 
collaborator who represents them and can solve some of their problems. That, for me, is 
crucial. 
 
Why is my government successful? First, because I am a technical person; I think that 
technical people can make good politicians, but politicians make poor technical people.  
 
 
f. Poverty, inequality and violence 
A final issue discussed with the four mayors was the grim reality of poverty and 
inequality that deeply divides the societies in which they live. They were asked for their 
views on this and what they had done to tackle these problems. Although public (as 
opposed to domestic) violence is currently not perceived as a major public order 
problem in any of the four cities, few municipalities in Colombia have been left 
unscarred from decades of conflict and the pressures of internally displaced populations.  
 
Sergio Fajardo (Medellín):  [Medellín is] much more equitable than before. To start 
with, there is a greater awareness across the whole city that we are all together in this. 
This is one of the big leaps we made. We have invested in a big way in low-income areas. 
I believe that when you ask people they will tell you “those are investments from all of us 
in Medellín”. We moved away from saying “those are Fajardo’s investments” to see them 
as wealth from which the whole society [can benefit]. There is a phrase by Héctor Abad 
[a well known journalist and writer from Medellín], a good friend of mine, who says that 
we redistributed wealth without appealing to the discourse of anger or aggression… We 
have done a lot in terms of public libraries surrounded by parks; everyone in Medellín 
knows about them, and they are proud of them; this is part of feeling part of this society. 
We have given a new lease on life to the public sphere. We have placed our bets on the 
state, on public education. People argue that education should be privatized [with the 
argument] that state education can only be of poor quality. We said that education must 
remain public because it embodies citizen solidarity. In Medellín we are supporting 
public education because it gives people a chance … I have no doubt that we have 
managed to elicit a conceptual-mental change in this city … And, what happened in the 
last municipal elections? A candidate from our movement won. That two mayors with the 
same roots succeed each other in office had never happened before, even in Bogotá. 
 
[Our break with the past consisted] in showing to Medellín that it made sense to have 
hope, a new approach to public management, a large urban intervention, education as an 
engine of social transformation in a way that had never been used before, a change of 
skin for the city, social urbanism. These are major interventions that go to the roots [of 
problems] and managed to change the city’s skin… Where there was despair there 
appeared public spaces to meet up with one another. Violence forces us to stay indoors. 
Instead, we can meet and create new relationships. Everything we build for the public 
sphere is linked with knowledge, with culture, with productive development, everything 
in the end to fight against social inequalities and ensure that we can live together. 
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‘Chico’ Zúñiga (Santa Marta): This city was paralyzed, it was full of difficulties, poor 
basic services … its population grew and services stagnated … and this became worse 
especially in recent years due to … the large number of internally displaced people 
fleeing violence [in neighbouring rural areas, mainly from paramilitary groups]… We 
have no way of responding with a greater coverage of infrastructure services, education, 
health, housing. This creates peripheries of misery, illegal squatting on unstable hills, 
environmental problems. Heavy rain covers the city in mud, the streets, the drainage 
system is overloaded, and people are unhappy to see the storm drainage unable to cope. 
It’s difficult… 
 
In this region we have had a serious problem with the paramilitaries influencing politics. 
We live with this every day. We hear of several members of Congress who have been 
detained because of links to the paramilitary.24 [Paramilitary groups] wanted to [illegally] 
appropriate local government funds for health, for education, by influencing the election 
of mayors, provincial governors, members of Congress.25 It was a way of keeping their 
influence, using State funds and in the process becoming rich. They used all these 
mechanisms to extort… to steal people’s land, and to get what they wanted from people 
using threats. The absence of a stronger State here has been a serious problem, and we 
have all suffered from it. There was no authority to support us, who would defend us? 
 
We had three strikes in Santa Marta, fostered by paramilitary groups. They forced shops 
to close and paralyzed the city. If you didn’t comply, they would turn up at your shop and 
say “either you shut up shop for the strike, or you die”, and they would keep their word. 
We have suffered for this…  
 
José E. Caicedo (Zipaquirá): The State was made for all, but especially for the weakest 
people. The State should give priority to vulnerable groups and people with needs to 
meet. That’s how I interpret it. That is my vision of the social sphere, which is the most 
important sector, and where we invested 60 per cent of the budget in the past four 
years… in a head-on clash against poverty, against the lack of education, against the lack 
of health services, against the right to good health… 
 
What am I outlining here? We are going to ‘build’ people first and later we can build 
things made of cement, surface roads, erect walls… My priority is given to three issues: 
education, health and care for vulnerable people.  
 
Each child that we snatch away from the lure of the street is guaranteed to be saved. Each 
child that we take away from traffic lights, from the street, is a child that we snatch away 
from drugs, crime, perversity. We must guarantee that children stay at school and that 
they enjoy going to school because they get a school meal, because they eat well. They 
                                                 
24 Under a 2005 national government law (‘Justice and Peace Act’) convicted paramilitary chiefs 
can negotiate for reduced prison terms in exchange for confessing all their crimes and providing 
the Justice system with names of politicians or civil servants with whom they entered into deals. 
This has led to a number of prominent politicians being investigated and, in several cases, jailed. 
25 This answer was in response to a question about the extent to which decentralisation in 
Colombia has facilitated the illegal appropriation of local government funds by illegal armed 
groups. For a detailed discussion, see Sánchez, Fabio and Mario Chacón, 2005, “Conflict, state 
and decentralisation: From social progress to an armed dispute for local control, 1974-2002”, 
Crisis States Programme Working Paper No. 70 (Series 1), London School of Economics. 
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are hungry. Going to school means they will do well. It is about giving people back their 
dignity, people who had to suffer as I did when I went to the same schools and I had to 
walk with worn-out shoes to school… 
 
We brought a state university to Zipaquirá, the provincial university, ours, which had no 
presence here… What do we want? We want that someone from the city who earns a 
minimum monthly wage can offer their children access to higher education, because they 
will never be able to afford the two to four thousand US dollars in fees at a private 
university in Bogotá. The provincial university will give the poorest people access to 
education. It will be beautiful to see that, once they have finished high school, instead of 
becoming young mothers, girls can say “Hold on, Mom, I will go on with my education 
because I can now work during the day and study in the evenings”.  
 
 
V. Concluding comments 
 
The interview format could rightly be criticised for providing one-sided views of what is 
in effect a complex set of political processes. Setting aside this obvious limitation, these 
testimonies provide an open and honest account of some of the pitfalls but also the 
great potential for change embodied in local governments in Colombia today. Whatever 
their motivations, these four men are clearly committed to their cities: they agreed to 
take on an elected position for a fixed period, with all the pecuniary and personal 
drawbacks that this entails, in a country where elected leaders are often victims of 
violence from illegal armed groups. 
 
The four mayors see themselves as political outsiders who oppose long established local 
political machineries to which they seek to bring a fresh breath of political air. A 
common trait to all is the zeal with which they see their job as mayor; for them this is 
akin to a ‘mission’, the search for a new form of local politics, involving a tough but 
much needed job of breaking with bad political habits and putting local government on a 
new financial footing. Their sense of purpose must be admired and is perhaps all the 
more poignant because they are able to express it so fervently even at the end of their 
administration. 
 
With the exception of Caicedo, Zipaquirá’s mayor, they depict themselves as being part 
of a small group who reject the present state of local politics and, perhaps inevitably, it 
is to this small group that they owe their allegiance. Although they remain largely 
unspecified, these groups of supporters would appear to be members of the local 
intelligentsia or local entrepreneurs on whose unconditional support the mayors can 
count. By contrast, and perhaps because of his own early history of acute poverty, 
Caicedo clearly feels more comfortable among the poor whom he sees as his natural 
political constituency.  
 
Without discarding poverty as an important area of concern, none of the other three 
mayors seem to see the poor as their natural interlocutors, stakeholders or supporters 
on whom they can rely for unswerving political support and to whom most of their 
energy is directed. In the case of Manizales, this may be partly explained by the fact 
that most of the poor who work in the city live in neighbouring municipalities from 
where they commute on a regular basis. In the case of Medellín, this may arise from the 
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large size and wealth of the city, the complex range of actors present in it, and the 
nature of local manufacturing, construction and service firms which have an almost 
overwhelming presence not merely in the city but in some instances also in the country. 
In Santa Marta’s case, the reality of a bankrupt local government and the constant 
intimidating presence of illegal armed groups would no doubt focus the mind of any 
local leader. 
 
It is interesting to note, finally, how aware of the media the mayors are. This is so 
because local radio stations and regional TV channels have opened new means of 
communication between them and their electors – and, in the process, have become 
powerful players themselves, increasingly shaping not only the message that local 
politicians are able to convey, but perhaps also what they choose to prioritise during 
their administration. This has been noted in US politics for some time. In Colombia, as in 
most other democracies, local politicians are increasingly expected to communicate with 
their voters in an effective way, and professional media outlets provide ready-made 
means to do so. Although there is no evidence from the interviews of it happening here, 
it is possible that this may eventually lead to a greater distancing of elected officials 
from the daily reality of local voters, particularly the poor who may not have access to 
TV sets. Were this to happen, it might contribute to a weakening of one of the strongest 
advantages that local government has over national governments in democratic systems 
– the physical proximity to its people. 
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PHOTOS 
 
 
Medellín mayor lecturing in DPU (UCL) in 2005 
 
 
 
Medellín’s Santo Domingo aerial cablecar serves poor communities 
 
 
 
Manizales mayor inaugurating a public swimming pool 
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Manizales as seen from the mayor’s office 
 
 
 
Santa Marta mayor 
 
 
Santa Marta Cathedral Square 
 
 
Zipaquirá mayor in his office 
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Zipaquirá’s main square from the mayor’s office 
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